Who will inherit the Kremlin?
03 Dec 2025
Photo: New-York Times*
The question of who will inherit political power in Russia after the end of the Vladimir Putin era remains a key one in the analysis of contemporary Russian politics. Despite periodic expectations of abrupt changes, empirical data and the logic of the Russian political system point to a high probability of a controlled transformation while preserving the basic principles of governance.
The current Russian extra-parliamentary opposition generally lacks the institutional, organizational, and human resources necessary to participate in the real distribution of power at the federal level. Over the past decades, its activities have focused primarily on protest mobilization and public criticism, rather than on the creation of sustainable alternative structures.
Exceptions with significant political clout included A.A. Navalny (who died on February 16, 2024, under circumstances that gave rise to widely discussed suspicions of political assassination)¹ and B.E. Nemtsov (killed on February 27, 2015)². After their elimination, the opposition field remained fragmented and devoid of figures capable of claiming a systemic role. Most of the remaining actors, consciously or forcedly, operate within a rigidly defined framework.
Main contenders for power.
"Heirs": the second generation of elites:
This group includes the children and close relatives of current or former senior officials in the political, security, and economic blocs. Among the most prominent figures are D.N. Patrushev, P.M. Fradkov, E.D. Bastrykin, O.V. Sergun, E.V. Tikhonova (V.V. Putin's presumed daughter)³, and other representatives of the second generation of elites.
Most of them were prepared in advance for high positions: appropriate education, internships, and early appointments to large state-owned companies and government agencies. They represent a natural continuation of the current system.
"Nomenklatura": the second-tier apparatus:
The second group consists of professional managers who have made their careers through loyalty, competence, and the ability to work within a complex bureaucratic structure: deputy ministers, department heads, governors, high-level aides and advisers. They possess:
• deep knowledge of the mechanics of government processes,
• stable horizontal connections,
• experience working within a centralized vertical power structure.
This group has traditionally ensured the stability of the Russian (and formerly Soviet) bureaucracy during leadership changes.
Historical Continuity and the "Rebranding" of Elites:
The history of Russia in the 20th and 21st centuries demonstrates a consistent pattern: despite a formal change of leader or even political regime, the core composition of the ruling class remains largely unchanged. The transition from the late Soviet nomenklatura to the post-Soviet, and then to Putin's vertical power structure was accompanied by partial rotation, but not a profound change of elites. A similar dynamic is likely in the post-Putin period.
The federal level of Russian politics has rarely been an arena for uncontrolled fluctuations. Localized episodes (for example, the unexpected victory of the spoiler in Berezovsky, followed by its annulment⁴) remain local. Factors capable of radically altering the elite configuration are extremely rare.
Despite sanctions policies and conflicts, the United States and leading European countries have an objective interest in maintaining a controlled Russian state for a number of reasons:
• control over significant stockpiles of nuclear materials (especially in the Urals),
• important interests in the Arctic (experts mention informal consultations on the format of interaction, including the exclusion of China⁵),
• ongoing commercial ties, including the purchase of Russian nuclear fuel.
A sharp destabilization of Russia would create risks comparable to the Yugoslav crisis of the 1990s⁶, but on a nuclear scale. Therefore, Western states are likely to support a managed transition of power rather than a revolutionary scenario.
The Russian Opposition: Why It Won't Become a Factor in the Transition of Power.
Theoretically, the opposition could claim a limited role in the context of partial liberalization. However, in practice, several factors hinder this.
First, after the elimination or marginalization of figures with national authority, there are no remaining actors in the opposition field capable of mobilizing a significant portion of society.
Second, a significant portion of the émigré opposition has settled in Europe and North America over the years.⁷ The stable existence of their lives abroad makes their return to Russia unlikely, even if the political situation changes. Their activities are primarily limited to media activity.
Third, the opposition has demonstrated a chronic inability to unite: stable coalitions have either failed to emerge or have disintegrated within a single electoral cycle. Competition for resources and the attention of Western institutions often outweighs efforts to consolidate.
Fourth, the rhetoric of some émigré groups has become so radical that it makes their participation impossible in any moderate transformation scenario is possible. Calls for "decolonization" and a radical restructuring of the country are perceived by a significant portion of society as a threat to statehood.
Therefore, the opposition remains an unlikely participant in a real transition of power. Even during a "thaw," dialogue will most likely be conducted with the moderate part of the existing nomenklatura and technocrats integrated into the system.
2. https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2025/02/27/20625470.shtml?utm_auth=false
3. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/russia-capitalism-daughters/
5. https://sjms.nu/articles/10.31374/sjms.196
6. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/breakup-yugoslavia
7. https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-65686712
* https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/08/world/europe/vladimir-putin-returns-to-presidency-in-russia.html